Jones does a fine job of summarizing Bachelard, and points out that his epistemology has influenced some of the great social theorists of the past three-quarters century such as Foucault, Deleuze, Althusser, and Bourdieu. It was the latter of these theorists that penned the required reading for this week's theory course. Bourdieu's entry "On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology" comes as an epilogue of a synthetic conference of sociologists in 1991. At the time, and as remains the case today, sociology is a fragmented discipline. We are broken into critical theorists, race scholars, social psychologists, network methodologists, medical sociologists, and the list goes on without any of the above being mutually exclusive entities per se. The problem with sociology, as many see it, is that the "polycentric" conception of knowledge that sociology proffers (Becker 1986) "cannot be controlled completely because of its very fragmentation and diversification" (Bourdieu 1991). In other words, sociology as a discipline seems to suffer from the multivalent streams of research being produced in its academic confines.
If we focus strictly on the power relations and ever-embedded nature of political influence that sociology seems to have in the social world, it is clear why many find this problematic. The monetary resources that almost any academic field depends on are controlled by the hegemonic forces of the political realm. For instance, the NSF and NIH are both reportedly reducing their budgets toward social science and humanities-based research. Perhaps, this is due to the "identity crisis." Maybe it is our anti-scientistic tendencies. Regardless of the true reason, Bourdieu prompts the reader to question herself: which logic do we pursue as sociologists and scientists more generally? The first logic he proposes is that we function on basis of the power groups associated and controlling the field (i.e. funding agencies, academic journals) or if we pursue the logic of the scientific field, impelled by Spinoza's "intrinsic force of the true idea" (Bourdieu 1991). He points out that many sociologists, among countless other academics, tend to see the latter through the lens set into focus by the former. Essentially, we are ruled by the dominating social forces of our historical landscape. As a result, we become hypnotized by dissident monologues that attempt only to subvert the opposing perspectives in our field as well as the other disciplines that threaten our own. The critical theorists scoff at the social psychologists, the quantitativists spit in the hair of the qualitative crowd, and so on. We are all seemingly guilty of a prolongated inferiority complex. Yet, Bourdieu argues that this will get us nowhere if our real objective is to engage in the latter of the two proposed logics.
Bourdieu points out that in order to move forward an advantageous practice of science we must understand the "working dissensus" of the field and arm ourselves, not with disciplinary strongholds, but with the weapons of discourse. We must engage in a metasociology of omega means, rather than an alpha end. This entails a "epistemological vigilance" that, like Bachelard, is based on the process of a dialectic. The ultimate goal of a scientific discipline is not to be scientistic, objective, or to locate the a priori truths that we have all seen undermined since Berger and Luckmann's (among others) treatise on the sociology of knowledge. The intersubjective perspective that both theorists propound is careful not to fall into the rabbit hole of a nihilistic escapism, but believes instead that science can help us better understand the world; to aid us in overcoming the power relations that negatively shape the social world. However, we must be willing to learn the language of our counterparts and to engage openly about the strengths and tribulations of our (inter-) disciplinary discourse in the creation of knowledge.
This is the most challenging aspect of my academic career thus far. Most sociologists are not open to the idea of interdisciplinary work, especially with that of the "natural sciences." These specious and, at times, unnecessarily dichotomous categories thwart the nature of a true scientific discourse. Though I have witnessed this proclivity from scholars at both of the institutions I have attended, it is by no means limited to sociology. I have recently spoken with clinical psychologists, English literature students, and even philosophers who stymie through their studies bewildered by the shackles of "discipline" as a social force. Just as Bachelard and Bourdieu propose, I hope to delve into many fields; to melt physics into poetry. I hope this objective will someday come to fruition, but it will undoubtedly need the motivated pursuit of understanding on the part of my colleagues as well. The good news is that some of the disciplinary confines are beginning to crumble; largely from the propulsion to understand the world in truly scientific terms. My frail edge of science bridges sociology and biology: social neuroscience and neurosociology. The contradistinction is necessary in an inappropriate and largely superficial sense, but when I -we- look back on this years later we will either understand the line drawn in the sand as the residue of a merciless power dynamic or snicker at the gaffe of such divides in a theory of knowledge.
Becker, H. 1986. Writing for Social Scientists. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Berger, P. L. & T. Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. “On the Possibility of a Field of World Sociology.” Pp. 373-386 in Social Theory for a Changing Society, edited by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman.
Jones, M. 1991. Gaston Bachelard, Subversive Humanist. University of Wisconsin Press.
Mead, G.H. 1932. The Philosophy of the Present. Prometheus Books.
